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COMMENTS*
THE ROLE OF PRECONCEPTIONS IN POLICY
ANALYSIS IN LAW: A RESPONSE TO
FISCHEL AND BRADLEY
Kenneth E. Scott t
INTRODUCTION
Monitoring management in the publicly-held corporation is a
complex but vital process that is only recently beginning to receive
the rigorous and critical attention, both theoretical and empirical,
that it deserves. Professors Fischel and Bradley are to be com-
mended for having made a stimulating and valuable contribution to
that study. There is much in their analysis that is sound and in-
sightful, and with which I certainly do not disagree. But the com-
mentator's function is not to lavish praise, but to take issue and
provoke discussion. Fortunately, from my point of view, Fischel and
Bradley (F&B) proceed at many points to draw conclusions from
their able analysis which may be consistent with their prior beliefs
but are, however, erroneous or unsupported.
In particular, in their discussion of the role of liability rules and
the derivative suit, F&B do not make enough of the distinction be-
tween the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the fiduciary duty of care.
The centrality of that distinction is a point that I have emphasized
elsewhere at some length,' and that F&B dispose of briefly, if not
cavalierly.2 On the basis of their own arguments and data, I shall try
to demonstrate that their view is incorrect. For convenience of ref-
erence, I shall parallel the structure of their paper.
At the outset, however, it is necessary to address the nature of
* Professor Fischel and Professor Bradley's paper underwent minor revisions after
completion of the following comments. Eds.
t Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School. A.B. 1949, Wil-
liam & Mary; M.A. 1953, Princeton University; LL.B. 1956, Stanford Law School.
1 Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35
STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983).
2 Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 290-91 (1986) [hereinafter
cited as F&B].
299
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
the distinction, which F&B dismiss as "artificial. ' 3 There is a great
deal of case law explicating the content of the duties of care and
loyalty, and, as usual, no concise summary of those voluminous
opinions can be wholly accurate. The essence of the distinction is in
my view nonetheless fairly straightforward:
The duty of care demands that top officers and members of
the board of directors invest a certain amount of time and effort
and exercise a certain level of skill and judgment in the operation
of the firm. The duty of loyalty requires that officers and directors
put the interests of the stockholders ahead of their personal gain
and subjects them to oversight in transactions involving conflicts
of interest.4
This distinction, like a multitude of others in law and logic, is
not always sharp and self-defining. F&B offer the standard example:
is loafing on the job to be characterized as a care violation or a loy-
alty violation?5 Their conundrum is not unsolvable, and I shall re-
turn to it subsequently. For the moment, it is enough to note that
the two concepts encompass a lot of territory far removed from the
boundary line. "Loyalty violations usually involve a knowing appro-
priation from the firm to the offender's personal gain, while care
violations involve the decisionmaker's asserted neglect or incompe-
tence, even in the absence of any personal profit. ' 6 In polar terms,
the difference is between theft and poor business judgment; the dis-
tinction may seem artificial to F&B , but it is useful in this as in other
areas of law.
I
LIABILITY RULES As A GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
The premise of the F&B argument is that the duties of loyalty
and care should be viewed as terms that are currently implied by law
in the employment contract between a company and its managers,
but that are inessential if not counterproductive. 7 The contract par-
adigm must not be taken too literally; it would suggest that manage-
ment's fiduciary duties could simply be abolished by an express
term to that effect in their employment contracts, a ploy that almost
certainly would not be successful.8 More accurately, fiduciary duties
3 Id. at 291. In the draft presented at the conference, F&B described the distinc-
tion as "artificial."
4 Scott, supra note 1, at 927-28.
5 F&B, supra note 2, at 291.
6 Scott, supra note 1, at 932.
7 F&B, supra note 2, at 266.
8 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722(a) (McKinney 1979) (forbidding corpora-
tions to indemnify director or officer "in relation to matters as to which such director or
officer is adjudged to have breached his duty to the corporation").
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are currently imposed on managers by legislators or judges and en-
forced through derivative suits, and F&B contend that should not be
the law.
Why should the liability rules that back up management's fidu-
ciary duties be dispensed with? Basically, F&B argue that they are
an ineffective means of obtaining good managerial performance, for
five reasons. First, it is quite difficult to separate bad judgment from
bad luck in an uncertain world; it is, therefore, impracticable to
write precise performance standards (with liability for their breach)
into an employment contract. The substituted general duty of care
is properly applicable only to the most extreme derelictions, for the
same reason. Second, managers are already sanctioned for poor
performance by a reduction in the value that their services can com-
mand in the labor market for future periods; liability rules, in F&B's
view, presumably add little. Third, the existence of an efficient stock
market greatly facilitates the effective operation of the capital and
takeover markets in ways that reward good performance and penal-
ize poor performance. Fourth, litigation with poorly performing
management would be a deterrent to the willingness of manage-
ment to develop firm-specific human capital. Fifth, the possibility of
having their liability erroneously assessed on the basis of bad luck
instead of bad decisions would lead risk-averse managers to behave
in a more cautious manner than shareholders would desire.9
Apart from questions about the validity of some of those pro-
positions, it is not altogether clear how they relate to the conclusion
F&B wish to draw. Certainly, the system of sanctions and incentives
that bear on managers of publicly-held corporations is complex, and
liability rules constitute merely a part of the total structure, but for
F&B to point out that other mechanisms exist is not enough. To
make their point definitively, they must show that liability rules are
completely redundant, and they have not attempted to do that. Nor
do they discuss the separate situation of the private corporation that
has no efficient trading market in its stock.
But the point I wish to make is a different one. Their argu-
ments are directed almost entirely against the duty of care, with lim-
ited or no applicability to the duty of loyalty issues. As previously
noted,' 0 I am in general agreement with F&B on the matter of liabil-
ity for care violations. The disadvantages of such liability seem to
me to dominate. But all the discussion of the hazards of decision-
making in an uncertain world has little to do with the extraction of
secret or excessive profits in self-dealing transactions. Market sanc-
tions for such conduct do remain, but they too have shortcomings.
9 F&B, supra note 2, at 264-70.
10 Scott, supra note 1, at932-37.
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Labor market revaluations hold few terrors for top executives near-
ing the end of their careers, and ouster through proxy fights or hos-
tile takeovers is both problematic and ever more costly. The real
issue is whether derivative suits for loyalty violations play a useful
role in establishing a lower ceiling on this type of agency cost than
would otherwise exist, and that is an issue F&B do not address.
Instead, F&B make a general assault on the device of the deriva-
tive suit, on the ground that plaintiffs and their attorneys have no
incentive to bring only those suits that maximize the value of the
firm.l1 In the course of that assault, F&B add to the already ample
stores of some common kinds of confusion in legal literature. First,
there is the confusion between the desirability of effective enforce-
ment of legal rules and the desirability of the legal rules themselves.
If a rule is harmful (e.g., minority shareholder can, on largely tech-
nical grounds, block an advantageous merger for strategic bargain-
ing reasons), no doubt its effective enforcement is not beneficial, but
the preferable solution is alteration of the rule, not emasculation of
all rule enforcement. As for the risk of strategic litigation per se
(suits brought in order to be bought off), nothing confines the prob-
lem to shareholders as plaintiffs. The problem exists with respect to
all forms of litigation, and defendants deal with it in a number of
ways, ranging from actions for abuse of process to establishment of
a reputation for refusing to pay off. Second, there is confusion over
whether the objective of certain rules is compensation to the injured
party or deterrence of the harmful conduct. F&B note that deriva-
tive suit attorneys will pursue a cause of action if expected attorneys'
fees are sufficient to make it a positive net present value project for
them, even though the amount of recovery to the firm in a particular
case might be exceeded by related costs for it. 12 For effective deter-
rence, of course, derivative suit attorneys should do exactly that;
then the problem will arise less often in the future. Again, one can
make arguments against effective deterrence of care liability because
of error costs and management risk aversion, as both F&B and I
have done, but those arguments have much less weight against loy-
alty liability. In the case of management theft from the corporation,
do F&B really find the "perverse incentive"13 of the plaintiff's attor-
ney to be an overriding consideration? Would they really believe
that a more nearly optimal decision on whether to bring suit would
be made by management's "special litigation committee"?
11 F&B, supra note 2, at 271-74.
12 Id.




ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ASSURING CONTRACTUAL
PERFORMANCE
Liability rules are not the only factor shaping managerial per-
formance incentives. F&B list some of the others: ultimate stock-
holder control over the firm through voting power, internal
monitoring by other managers and through the board of directors,
external monitoring in various ways through the capital markets,
and performance-related compensation plans. 14 Having reviewed
the list, F&B proceed to claim that these other governance mecha-
nisms are more important than legal rules in assuring managerial
performance.15
This claim is weak and largely irrelevant. The claim is weak be-
cause the evidence bearing on it, in either direction, is also weak.
Given the existence of a complex, multi-layered structure of incen-
tives and monitoring (of which derivative suits form a part), it is ex-
tremely difficult to measure the effects and importance of any one
element in isolation, and the evidence F&B adduce is not adequate
for that purpose. They claim that Delaware has legal rules which
minimize the threat of legal liability and nonetheless leads in
reincorporation choices. 16 The argument depends, among other
things, on an (unmade) comparative evaluation of state corporation
laws and runs counter to such leading decisions as Zapata v. Maldo-
nado17 and Smith v. Van Gorkom, '8 as well as to the absence of any
security bond requirement for derivative suits in Delaware law.
Thus, we have little reason to believe that liability rules are gener-
ally less important than the other factors they mention.
But even if the claim of lesser importance were well supported,
what of it? The elements in this array of monitoring and incentive
devices are not mutually exclusive; they co-exist and play somewhat
different and specialized functions. To make their point and sup-
port their conclusion, F&B must do more than show that derivative
suits are one among a number of mechanisms bearing on manage-
rial performance; they must show that derivative suits based on fidu-
ciary liability rules are actually harmful. That is what they proceed
to attempt in the next section.
14 Id. at 274-76.
15 Id. at 276.
16 Id. at n.43.
17 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
18 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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III
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF
DERIVATIVE STOCKHOLDER SUITS
In an admirable effort to move the discussion from the domain
of prior belief and inconclusive argument to the domain of empirical
research, F&B made an abnormal return study of forty-eight firms
involved in litigation on the maintenance of derivative suits.19 In
thirty-two of the cases, the court dismissed the derivative suit; in
sixteen cases, the court ruling permitted the suit to continue. In
each case, F&B set the date of the court's decision as day zero and
then calculated the abnormal return on day zero and the cumulative
abnormal return from day zero through one and four days thereaf-
ter. From their data, F&B conclude that the wealth effects of deriva-
tive stockholder suits are trivial20 and hence that "derivative suits
are not an important monitoring device to curb managerial
malfeasance." 21
The main difficulty with the F&B study is that they misinterpret
their own results. For clarity, let us re-examine the central find-
ings-the market reactions on the event date to the courts' decision
for the two outcome portfolios-without the authors' preconcep-
tions. When the derivative suit was thrown out, the value of the firm
fell by 0.7% (AR: -0.69; t-stat: -2.13);22 when the suit was allowed
to proceed, shareholder wealth increased by 1.1% (AR: 1.085; t-
stat: 1.76).23 The market evaluation of derivative suits, in other
words, is inconsistent with the hypothesis that they do not serve
shareholders' interests.
But, reply F&B, the wealth effects involved are "slight" and "in-
significant," 24 showing that investors do not greatly value liability
rules as a governance mechanism. This reply raises the question of
the precise formulation of the hypothesis being tested. If derivative
suits are in fact efficiently enforcing the fiduciary constraints on
management, what does that imply for the amount at stake in the
lawsuit? It has to be enough to warrant the cost and risk being as-
sumed by the plaintiff's attorney in maintaining the action, but do
we expect it to be a significant fraction of the total value of ex-
change-listed (i.e., large) firms? If deterrence is at all effective and
the market for derivative suits is at all competitive, we would expect
19 The results of F&B's study are included in Tables 5-7, infra. For their raw data,
see F&B, supra note 2, at Tables 1-4.
20 F&B, supra note 2, at 281-82.
21 Id. at 282.
22 See infra Table 5.
23 See infra Table 6.
24 F&B, supra note 2, at 282.
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to see such suits brought at a relatively early time in a course of
managerial malfeasance and for amounts that are relatively minor in
relation to the size of the firm. "Slight" wealth effects are not incon-
sistent with the hypothesis.
If the effects one is looking for are slight, however, they may be
difficult to ascertain with confidence. The t-statistics on the event
date results quoted above are, it should be noted, significant at the
ninety-five percent level and the ninety percent level, respectively. 25
F&B deal with the awkwardness of that finding by spreading an ad-
mittedly small magnitude effect over a five day period and then re-
porting that none of the decision-week returns is significantly
different from zero.26
F&B then proceed to see whether the loyalty/care distinction
makes any difference; they separate out the loyalty actions and get
almost identical results.27 That process raises a question as to the
criteria they used to make the partition; for example, if a complaint
has both care and loyalty claims, to which category was it assigned?
I re-checked the sample and made my own division, based on
whether the suit contained a demand for the recovery of personal
gains received by the defendants. I found my division did make
some difference: for the seventeen loyalty violation dismissals, the
negative abnormal return rose to 1% (AR: -1.07; t-stat: -1.72), while
in the twenty-one care dismissals it fell to a negative 0.4% (AR: -
.436; t-stat: -1.19).28
To be sure, the sample of cases is too limited, and the effect is
in all likelihood too small, to afford a basis for drawing any strong
conclusions in either direction. But whatever these preliminary data
may be worth, their signs are on the whole contrary to the F&B posi-
tion and consistent with a position that derivative suits serve share-
holders' interests. They certainly do not show that the costs to the
firm of having its management defend a derivative suit outweigh the
anticipated stockholder gains. I trust it is not unappreciative of
F&B's innovative and useful work to point that out.
IV
THE ROLE OF LIABILITY RULES IN CORPORATE LAW
Returning to their central argument, F&B note that other legal
rules at times cut back the apparent scope of the fiduciary duties of
25 That is, given the variability shown in the data, there is only a 5% and a 10%
probability (respectively) that the real effect on shareholder wealth is zero (the "null
hypothesis").
26 F&B, supra note 2, at 281.
27 Id. at 282.
28 See infra Appendix and Tables 7 & 8.
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loyalty and care, as well as the efficacy of derivative suit enforce-
ment. In a descriptive sense, they are unquestionably correct. Re-
grettably, courts have sometimes applied the business judgment
rule to conflict of interest transactions, as well as to the duty of care
suits for which it was originally created. 29 Certain courts have al-
lowed the procedure of approval by disinterested directors to ob-
scure the reality of abuse of control. 30 Indemnification and
insurance do indeed alter the deterrent impact of liability rules,
although again mainly in the area of care liability and not in the area
of loyalty liability, which is usually excluded from coverage. The ap-
praisal remedy does cut down on the prospect of care liability for
merger transactions, although it is not always treated as the exclu-
sive remedy if the gravamen of the complaint is for self-dealing. 31
And no one would dispute that a number of special burdens have
hobbled the derivative suit mechanism.
But what normative conclusion is one supposed to derive from
all that? The existence of a jumble of rules and partial exceptions,
differing from one jurisdiction to another, proves very little about
what the pattern ought ideally to be. Even a member of the Pan-
glossian school of law and economics, who believes that whatever is
must be efficient, would gain little guidance from such a confused
and conflicting tangle of doctrine. Further, if one considers transac-
tion costs and transitional disequilibria, the status quo can no longer
lay firm claim to efficiency, thereby leaving academics free to in-
dulge their professional proclivity for evaluation and debate even on
that score.
My own observation is that the countervailing doctrines listed
by F&B have undermined care liability more than loyalty liability.
29 See, e.g., Hendricks v. Mill Eng'g & Supply Co., 68 Wash. 2d 490, 413 P.2d 811
(1966) (business judgment rule invoked to validate decision of board to redeem some of
stock held by majority shareholders, reducing their holdings to less than 50%o of voting
power and preserving board's control); Matteson v. Zeibarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d
1025 (1952) (business judgment rule invoked to validate merger agreement whereby
controlling shareholder received lucrative employment contract from acquiring corpora-
tion); Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 153 Conn. 527, 218 A.2d 526 (1966) (ex-presi-
dent's employment contract evaluated under business judgment standard).
3o See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979). Compare Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979) (approval by disinter-
ested board members makes fairness inquiry unnecessary) with Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (fairness inquiry necessary despite approval by
disinterested board members).
31 See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (when sole purpose
of merger is cash-out of minority, availability of statutory appraisal remedy does not
satisfy controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty to minority); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267
Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977) (same); Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Il. App. 261,
106 N.E.2d 848 (1952) (allegation of fraud in sale of assets makes statutory demand for
fair value nonexclusive remedy); Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 382
N.E.2d 1030 (1978) (same).
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My main criticism of that tendency is that courts have not applied it
with sufficient consistency and clarity. In particular, reducing the
incidence of care liability by making derivative suits more cumber-
some and difficult to maintain has had undesirable spillover effects
on deterrence of loyalty violations.3 2
V
THE ANALYSIS OF DERIVATIVE SUITS IN THE ALI REPORT
F&B criticize the ALI Project on Corporate Governance draft
proposals, which preserve the derivative suit in something like its
traditional form. For example, the ALI drafters suggest that deriva-
tive actions reduce average agency costs, and F&B's rejoinder is that
they found "no evidence" that investors valued derivative suits. 33
This is a modest rebuttal at best, and one that rests on a tendentious
reading of their own data. F&B also attack the ALI draftsmen for
repeatedly purporting to choose the "best" rule from a conflicting
set, with no real basis in theory or evidence for their personal
choice.3 4 I have considerable sympathy with that criticism, because
one of the dangers of the ALI Project is that its selection of rules
may contribute to settling and freezing areas of corporate law
before we adequately understand how these rules function. Instead,
urge F&B, we should let the individual firm choose the exact set of
liability or nonliability rules which will govern it, and in the long run
we will be able to determine what rules are optimal, and when, and
for whom.35 However valid that approach might be in the long run,
in the short run it would permit wealth transfers from stockholders
to managers. If, contrary to F&B's expectations, a corporation's
adoption of a no-derivative-suit rule were to create a large negative
abnormal return for its shareholders, what would F&B suggest? A
lawsuit against themselves?
But I most want to take issue with F&B's comments on the dis-
tinction between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The dis-
tinction between these duties is reflected in the ALI draft, but I
would emphasize it still more. F&B's strategy for obliterating the
distinction is to focus on the boundary case: loafing on the job can
be viewed as inadequate effort and inattention (a care violation) or
as the extraction of additional compensation (a loyalty violation).36
Uncertainty over proper characterization of the boundary case is
then supposed to prove that there is no (nonartificial) distinction
32 See Scott, supra note 1, at 940-46.
33 F&B, supra note 2, at 289.
34 Id. at 290.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 291.
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between the two concepts. Leaving that nonsequitur aside, I would
suggest that the answer to a problem in characterization is, as usual,
to be found by recourse to the purpose for which the characteriza-
tion is being made. In the world I am advocating, the consequence
of calling shirking a care violation would be to leave it to monitoring
by the labor and capital markets and not by derivative lawsuits and
judges. Because it is difficult to measure effort, concentration, and
attention ex post in a court of law, and to disentangle these factors
from all others in accounting for a bad outcome, the task is one I
believe best left to the market and its replacement mechanisms.
But, say F&B, shirking means that management is realizing un-
due compensation, and most loyalty violations can be thought of as
extracting extra compensation, so why not just leave it all to the
market?3 7 The answer, I believe, is twofold. First, F&B contend
that compensation is even easier for the market to monitor than ef-
fort,38 but that conclusion is not necessarily true when the compen-
sation is hidden and covert, as it often is in loyalty violations.
Appropriation through not working very hard is readily apparent to
one's peers, and subject to Fama's type of monitoring,3 9 but appro-
priation in conflict of interest transactions is often concealed insofar
as possible from everyone. If hidden appropriation is to be ferreted
out, someone, such as the plaintiff's attorney, must have profit in-
centives to do so. The existence of the liability rule and derivative
suit, in turn, tends to force management to choose overt means of
compensation, thus enabling other monitoring mechanisms
(through the board of directors, labor market, and capital market) to
work more effectively. Second, the task before a court in a loyalty
case is one for which it is better suited. The inquiry is into the terms
of one or a few transactions, and the question is often the compara-
bility of a private sale price to a market standard. Although not
without its subjective elements, the analysis is far more simple and
reliable than in a duty of care case where the court must assess the
interaction of a multitude of factors in a business disaster.
CONCLUSION
In short, the distinction between care and loyalty rules is no
more artificial than any other and enables us to design intelligently a
structure of law for the governance of the modern corporation.
Although F&B never quite come out and avow it, apparently they
are sympathetic to the abolition of both care and loyalty liability
rules and, along with them, the derivative suit, which would no
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
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longer have any function to serve. That position, I submit, is not
supported by either the theory of liability rules, the available empiri-
cal evidence, or the structure of corporate law. A better (though
still rather tentative) case can be made for the abolition of care lia-
bility while maintaining liability for loyalty violations. It is hard to
conceive how the interests of shareholders would be advanced in a
world where managers who helped themselves in subtle ways to the
firm's assets could not be sanctioned short of ouster in a hostile
takeover, assuming that possibility even survives the current toler-
ance of unbridled defensive maneuvers. But that, I take it, is the
implicit recommendation of Fischel and Bradley.
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APPENDIX*
Fischel and Bradley's study was rerun using several different
partitions of their data base. We used the date of the announcement
of a court decision as the zero date, as they did, and computed beta-
adjusted abnormal returns as of the zero date and for one week
thereafter.40
Before rerunning the study, we made some adjustments to the
F&B data base. After reading the cited cases, we first determined
that some of their data points had been misspecified: the corpora-
tion listed was not the entity on whose behalf the derivative suit had
been brought. In most of those cases, the entity on whose behalf
the suits had been brought was not a corporation with stock listed
on the New York or American Stock Exchange, and we had to delete
the data point from the base. In one case, the entity was listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, so the data point was retained as
corrected. These deletions and corrections are noted on Tables 1
through 4. Second, we noted that a number of the decision dates
used as zero dates in their study represented affirmances or rever-
sals by appellate courts of dismissals or refusals to dismiss by lower
courts. We suspected that investors might generally expect a lower
court's decision to be affirmed, so that abnormal returns on the date
of an affirmance might be lower in absolute value than abnormal
returns on the date of the original decision, while abnormal returns
on the date of a reversal would not exhibit the same tendency. We
therefore attempted to determine in each case the dates of the lower
court opinions not cited by F&B.
We then calculated abnormal returns using two different data
bases: first, a data base which included all the decision dates,
whether of lower or appellate courts; second, a data base which in-
cluded only the dates of lower court decisions and of appellate re-
versals, omitting affirmances.
We first calculated abnormal returns while preserving F&B's
partition of the data base into cases in which the court's decision
centered on the issue of demand requirements and cases in which
the decision centered on the effect of a ruling by a special litigation
committee. These results are reported in Tables 5 and 6.
We then repartitioned the data base in an effort to distinguish
between abnormal returns in cases involving allegations of self-en-
richment or personal dishonesty on the part of officers and directors
and cases involving only allegations of poor business judgment.
* This reexamination of the F&B empirical study was a joint undertaking with my
research assistant, Greg Shrock.
40 Our data and results are set out and compared to F&B's in Tables 1-8, infra.
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F&B made a partition based on whether the plaintiffs had made alle-
gations of "breach of loyalty," but the criteria by which they made
this separation are not clear. We therefore read the cases and made
our own partition based on whether the plaintiffs had made allega-
tions of personal enrichment. Most of the complaints alleging per-
sonal enrichment focused on management remuneration, but a
significant minority alleged actual misuse of corporate assets or en-
trenchment in control by blocking takeover attempts by outsiders.
Tables 1 through 4 indicate how we made this partition. The results
are reported in Tables 7 and 8.
The insignificant results in the sample of cases in which the
plaintiffs had not alleged personal enrichment by management led
us to investigate this sample further. Many of the data points in this
sample involved cases in which the primary allegation had been that
management paid or allowed others to pay illegal foreign bribes or
illegal foreign or domestic campaign contributions. We suspected
that investor concern over such allegations might be minimal, since
such payments might well enhance the corporation's profitability
despite their illegality. If so, we would not expect significant nega-
tive abnormal returns from the dismissal of a suit seeking to disci-
pline management for making such payments. We therefore
partitioned this sample into those cases that had primarily involved
allegations of illegal payments and those that had not. Tables 1
through 4 indicate how this partition was made. Table 8 reports the
results.
The apparently significant abnormal returns to the sample of
cases in which the plaintiffs had alleged personal enrichment led us
to also investigate this sample further. We suspected that this sam-
ple might have been skewed by the presence of a number of cases
involving allegations that management had entrenched itself in con-
trol by resisting an attempted acquisition by outsiders, since merg-
ers and acquisitions often induce large price movements in a
corporation's stock. We therefore computed abnormal returns in
cases involving allegations of entrenchment and report these re-
turns in Table 7.
Our results were in many respects similar to F&B's. They found
average abnormal returns to shareholders of all firms having deriva-
tive suits dismissed by court action of -0.690% (significant at the 5%
level); we found average abnormal returns of -0.642% (significant at
the 10% level) for the sample of dismissals only and -0.692% (sig-
nificant at the 5% level) for the sample of dismissals and affirmances
of dismissals. 41 The results of our partition of all dismissals into
41 See Table 5.
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those in which the demand requirement had not been met and those
in which a special litigation committee had ruled against the plain-
tiffs also looked similar to their results. Both sets of results sup-
ported the hypothesis that shareholders' derivative suits benefit
stockholders and that the dismissal of a derivative suit should unfa-
vorably affect the stock's price.
Our results differed from those of F&B in one important re-
spect. They found positive abnormal returns to the stockholders of
firms having derivative suits challenged by management but not dis-
missed by the courts of 1.085% (significant at the 10% level) on the
date of the decision and 1.794% (significant at the 5% level) for the
two days beginning on the date of the decision.42 We found insig-
nificant negative abnormal returns both on the decision date and for
the two days beginning with the decision date.43 In a sense, our re-
sults are disappointing-F&B's results tend to support our hypothe-
sis that shareholders benefit from derivative suits, while our results
tend to support their thesis that derivative suits have little effect on
shareholders' well-being. In defense of our thesis, however, we
make two observations. First, our sample is too small to interpret
the results as strong support for anything; the sample contains only
thirteen data points. Second, insignificant abnormal returns upon
refusals to dismiss are not necessarily inconsistent with our thesis; a
dismissal is (except in the rare case where a dismissal is reversed by
an appeals court) a final disposition of a case and thus may have a
larger effect on the stock price than a refusal to dismiss, which is not
a final disposition.
Our results also differed from F&B's in the pattern of abnormal
returns we found after partitioning the sample into cases alleging
personal enrichment by managers and directors and cases not mak-
ing such allegations. F&B's partition based on "breach of duty of
loyalty" found insignificant negative returns upon dismissals of de-
rivative suits charging breach of the duty of loyalty and insignificant
positive abnormal returns upon refusals to dismiss. 44 Our partition
found abnormal returns upon dismissals and affirmances of dismis-
sals of derivative suits alleging personal enrichment of -1.007% (sig-
nificant at the 10% level) on the date of the decision and -1.661%
(significant at the 5% level) for the two days beginning on the date
of the decision. 45 These results support our thesis that derivative
suits are valuable to shareholders in policing management self-deal-
ing. Moreover, the inclusion of cases involving hostile takeover at-
42 See Table 6.
43 Id.
44 See Table 7.
45 Id.
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tempts in the sample has not distorted these results; the abnormal
returns in such cases were positive, and their exclusion only in-
creases the size and significance of the negative abnormal returns to
the stockholders of firms in this category.
F&B did not exhibit their findings concerning abnormal returns
to the stockholders of firms involved in derivative suits not alleging
a breach of the duty of loyalty. For our corresponding sample, how-
ever, we found insignificant negative abnormal returns upon dismis-
sals and affirmances of dismissals of derivative suits not alleging
personal enrichment by managers and directors.46 The insignifi-
cance of these results would seem to support F&B's thesis. For the
sample which deleted cases primarily alleging illegal campaign con-
tributions and foreign bribes, however, we found negative abnormal
returns that were much larger in absolute value than the abnormal
returns to the sample as a whole and whose t-statistics approached
significance, despite the fact that this subsample included only seven
data points. 47 We think that these results also support our hypothe-
sis that derivative suits are positively valued by the market.
46 See Table 8.
47 Id.
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TABLE 1
Cases Dismissed for Failure to Meet Demand Requirements
Case (company if not named) Decision Illegal Breach of
Date(s) Payments Duty of
Loyalty
Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 07/18/78
582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978). affirming
08/22/77
Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Industries, 12/21/78 x
454 F. Supp. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 590 affirming
F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1978). 06/20/78
Greenspun v. Del. E. Webb Corp., 12/29/80 x
634 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1980) (date of affirming
original decision not in data base)
Haber v. Bell (Oneok Corp.), 06/13/83 x
465 A.2d 353 (Del. Ch. 1983).
Kemper v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., Deleted
365 F. Supp. 1272 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
[Deleted because ABC was not the corporation on whose behalf the suit was
brought. The suit was brought on behalf of Kittyhawk Television Corp.]
Laufer v. Olla Industries, 04/29/83
729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'g 96 affirming
F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 12/29/82
Lewis v. Graves (McDermott), 02/28/83 x
701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983) (date of affirming
original dismissal not in data base).
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 06/18/81 x
91 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Shlensky v. Dorsey (Gulf Oil), 03/06/78 x
574 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1978). affirming
11/18/76
Smachlo v. Birkelo (Burlington Northern), 12/27/83 x
576 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Del. 1983).
Stotland v. GAF Corp., 12/05/83 x
469 A.2d 421 (Del. Supr. 1983), affg Del. affirming
Ch. Civil Action No. 6876 (Sept. 1, 1983). 07/10/83
Tanjer v. Sharon Steel Corp., 06/22/79 x
[1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,915 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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TABLE 2
Cases Dismissed Based on Rulings by Special Litigation
Committees
Case (company if not named) Decision Illegal Breach of
Date(s) Payments Duty of
Loyalty
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 08/06/79 x
603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), aff'g 460 F. affirming
Supp. 1242 (D. C. Minn. 1978). 12/07/78
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 09/07/82
546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982).
Abramowitz v. Posner (NFV), 02/09/82 X
672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982).
Ash v. IBM, 11/17/65
353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), aff'g 236 F. affirming
Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 11/25/64
Auerbach v. Bennett (GTE), 07/09/79
419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. affirming
App. 1979) (reversing decision dated 05/13/77
8/17/78 (Table 4), which reversed
decision dated 5/13/77).
Burke v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio RR Co., 03/30/71 x
324 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
Gaines v. Haughten (Lockheed Aircraft), 05/18/81 x
645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981). affirming
04/20/79
Genzer v. Cunningham (Burroughs), 09/26/80 x
498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
Lewis v. Anderson (Disney), 10/29/79 X
615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1980) (date of affirming
original dismissal not in data base)
Maldonado v. United Brands Co., 01/24/84 X
485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Meer v. United Brands Co., 02/21/79 x
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,794 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 08/16/82 X
544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 09/06/83 x
[1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,571 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Parkoffv. GTE, 03/11/80 x
74 App. Div. 2d 762, 425 N.Y.S.2d 599
(1980).
Rosengarten v. 1TT Corp., 02/28/79 x
466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
Stein v. Bailey (McDermott), 02/04/82 x
531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Zapata v. Maldonado, 05/13/81 x
430 A.2d 779 (1981), rev'g Maldonado v.
Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (1980) (reversing
opinion dated 4/18/80 (Table 4)).
Byers v. Baxter (Allied Chemical), 06/28/78
419 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979) (Table 4)
(reversing opinion dated 6/28/78).
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TABLE 3
Cases Not Dismissed for Failure to Meet Demand Requirement
Demand Excused
Case (company if not named) Decision Illegal Breach of
Date(s) Payments Duty of
Loyalty
Altman v. Place (Anaconda Corp.), 05/25/78 x
405 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1978).
[The suit was brought on behalf of Anaconda; I U International Corp. was the
defendant.]
Barr v. Wackman (Talcott National Corp.), 04/01/75 x
368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 329 N.E.2d 180 (1975), affirming
aff'g 43 App. Div. 2d 689, 350 N.Y.S.2d
428 (1973) (affirms affirmance dated
12/20/73 of dismissal dated 7/3/73).
Bergstein v. Texas International Co., 10/04/82 x
453 A.2d 467 (Del. 1982).
[The original decision was issued 10/4/82; the opinion was modified 10/12/82.]
Fradkin v. Ernst (Mohawk Rubber Co.), 09/01/83 x
571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
General Electric Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., Deleted
563 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
[The suit was brought on behalf of a corporation not listed on any exchange,
namely, a corporation owned 60% by Bucyrus-Erie and 40% by General Electric.]
In re Ceasar's Palace Securities Litigation 05/23/73 x
(Lum's Ins.), 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
Kaufman v. Beal (Englehard), 02/25/83 x
Del. Ch., Civil Action No. 6485, Hartnett,
V.C. (Feb. 25, 1983).
Lewis v. Curtis (Hammermill Paper), 03/03/82 x
671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1982).
Siegel v. Merrick (Twentieth Century Fox), 10/24/79 x
84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Tarlov v. Paine Webber Cashfund, Inc., Deleted
559 F. Supp. 429 (D. Conn. 1983).
[The suit was brought on behalf of a mutual fund (managed by Paine Webber)
which was not listed on any exchange. It was not brought on behalf of Paine
Webber; Paine Webber was the defendant.]
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TABLE 4
Cases Not Dismissed Contrary to Recommendation by
Special Litigation Committee
Business Judgment Rule Does Not Apply
Case (company if not named) Decision Illegal Breach of
Date(s) Payments Duty of
Loyalty
Byers v. Baxter (Allied Chemicals), 06/26/79
419 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979) (reversing
dismissal dated 6/28/78 (Table 2)).
Galf v. Alexander (TRW), 01/22/80 x
615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 07/30/76 x
418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Levy v. Sterling Drug Co., 11/22/77 x
N.Y.LJ., Nov. 23, 1977, p. 10, col. 3 (N.Y.
Supp. 1977).
[The opinion was published 11/23/77 but was issued on an earlier date.]
Maldonado v. Flynn (Zapata), 04/18/80 x
413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
Maher v. Zapata, 05/27/80 x
490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
Auerbach v. Bennett (GTE), 08/17/78
419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (Table 2)
(reversing decision dated 8/17/78).
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TABLE 5
Average Abnormal Returns to the Stockholders of Firms Having
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Average Abnormal Returns to the Stockholders of Firms Having
Derivative Suits Challenged by Management But Not
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TABLE 7
Average Abnormal Returns to the Stockholders of Firms Involved
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Average Abnormal Returns to the Stockholders of Firms Involved




Number Decision Decision Day











































*Decision Day Plus Four Days After
Decision
Week*
0.429
(0.63)
0.896
(0.96)
-0.505
(-0.58)
-0.087
(-0.16)
0.142
(0.21)
-0.547
(-0.73)
0.822
(0.81)
0.970
(0.85)
2.007
(1.35)
-1.105
(-0.23)
-0.194
(-0.23)
0.752
(0.72)
-0.925
(-0.73)
1.312
(0.85)
